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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2019, a shooter opened fire on two mosques in Christchurch,
New Zealand.1 As explained in his manifesto, the shooter specifically intended to

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2020; B.A. Political Science, Loyola
University New Orleans, 2018. Thank you to Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
Professor of Law, for the inspiration, support, and guidance that was necessary for me to complete this comment.
Further thanks to Professor Michael Vitello, Distinguished Professor of Law, for supplemental support on the
criminal law issues that are raised in this Comment. And as always, thank you to my Village, that has been there
for me through every academic and personal endeavor that I have undertaken in my life.
1. Christchurch Attack: Brenton Tarrant Pleads Not Guilty to All Charges, BBC (June 14, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia48631488?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c966094wvmqt/christchurch-mosqueshootings&link_location=live-reporting-story (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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target the Muslim community.2 The gunman now faces fifty-one counts of murder
and forty counts of attempted murder for the carnage he caused.3
His campaign of terror did not stop inside the mosques.4 Footage of the attack
instantaneously radiated far beyond Christchurch due to the shooter’s
contemporaneous livestreaming of the attack to Facebook from a camera mounted
on his head.5 Reproduction and dissemination of the horrifying video continued on
the Internet, even after the livestream ended.6
The attack in New Zealand and the associated livestream are not isolated
instances.7 On October 9, 2019, a gunman attacking a synagogue in Germany
streamed a similar video of his attack online.8 Within thirty minutes of posting the
video, approximately 2,200 people streamed the footage before the website host
removed it.9 Initial investigations found that viewers of the German video sent
messages encouraging others to watch the video and share it. 10 The footage online
from Christchurch and Germany continued on with a life of its own, long after the
terror attacks subsided.11
Following violent attacks, victims and their families face exposure to and may
relive these horrific events through traumatizing online footage.12 Not only do

2. Max Walden, New Zealand Mosque Attacks: Who Is Brenton Tarrant?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-mosque-attacks-brenton-tarrant-190316093149803.html (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Christchurch Attack: Brenton Tarrant Pleads Not Guilty to All Charges, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; New Zealander Jailed for Sharing Christchurch Mass Shooting Video, AL JAZEERA (June 18, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/zealander-jailed-sharing-christchurch-mass-shooting-video190618063252482.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter New Zealander
Jailed].
7. See Germany Shooting: 2,200 People Watched on Twitch, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49998284 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing a similar situation in Germany where an attacker at a synagogue live-streamed his attack to online
website Twitch).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Video Showing Deadly Shooting Near Synagogue on Yom Kippur was Livestreamed, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:51 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/germany-synagogue-shooting-halle-grenadereportedly-thrown-jewish-cemetery-today-2019-10-09/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(illustrating the widespread sharing of the video of an attack against a German mosque and that “the video was
viewed by about 2200 people in the halfhour before it was flagged and removed . . . and [d]ownloaded versions,
however, were circulated in far-right online groups”); Olivia Solon, Six Months after Christchurch Shootings,
Videos of Attack Are Still on Facebook, NBC (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/sixmonths-after-christchurch-shootings-videos-attack-are-still-facebook-n1056691 (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the video from the Christchurch livestream was still on Facebook six
months after the attack happened).
12. Amy Wiggins, Christchurch Mosque Shooting: Livestream Viewing Traumatic for Many, NZ HERALD
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12214696 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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victims and their families face an emotional—and potentially physical—uphill
battle of trying to comprehend and heal from their firsthand accounts, but they
must also live in a world where what is likely to be the darkest day of their lives
has found a new life online.13 The footage from the terror livestreams often depicts
wounded or dead bodies and other reminders of the carnage.14
In New Zealand, one of the sharers of the footage faces a jail sentence of
twenty-one months under a New Zealand law prohibiting the distribution of
objectionable content.15 Globally, other countries have laws that similarly punish
the glorification of terror.16 However, it is unlikely that regulation of violent
footage in the United States, under similar legislation, is possible due to the strong
speech protections the United States Constitution provides.17
First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States protects speech that is
unpopular and upsetting.18 Rationalization of the strength of the First Amendment,
in part, is founded on the idea that freedom of speech concerning public issues lies
at the heart of self-governance.19 First Amendment protections make regulation of
speech impossible unless such regulation can pass heightened scrutiny or satisfy
one of the “categories” the Supreme Court determined to be unworthy of
protection.20
A distinction between speaking and expressing exists from a theoretical
13. See Katy McLaughlin & Jeena A. Kar, Aftermath of the Parkland Shooting: A Case Report of PostTraumatic
Stress
Disorder
in
an
Adolescent
Survivor,
CUREUS
(Nov.
11,
2019),
https://assets.cureus.com/uploads/case_report/pdf/24706/1576171026-20191212-29551-rq4x53.pdf (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder in a student
who survived a mass shooting at her school); Wiggins, supra note 12 (describing the potential psychological
impacts that may result after viewing violent footage); see also Graham Macklin, The Christchurch Attacks:
Livestream
Terror
in the
Viral Video Age,
CTC SENTINEL, July 2019, at 18
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing the threat of terrorism in New Zealand to be “a ‘latent’ threat rather than a ‘lived
reality,’ [where the country] suffered the single largest loss of life to terrorism in its history”).
14. Wiggins, supra note 12.
15. Charlotte Graham-McLay, New Zealand Man Gets 21 Months for Sharing Video of Christchurch
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/asia/new-zealand-video.html
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. See infra Part III (detailing some of the approaches taken by other countries); see also Australia Blocks
Access to Eight Websites Showing Video of New Zealand Mosque Attacks, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-shooting-australia/australia-blocks-access-to-eight-websitesshowing-video-of-new-zealand-mosque-attacks-idUSKCN1VU034 (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing new legislation in Australia that permits penalization of social media companies for
failing to expeditiously remove violent content from their platforms).
17. See infra Part IV (summarizing the various complexities of the First Amendment and the strength of
the right to freedom of speech).
18. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that the remedy
to bad speech is “more speech” and Americans should challenge laws that abridge free speech).
19. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
20. See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 1030
(2013) (describing that First Amendment litigation requires “‘heightened scrutiny,’ which requires that the
restriction be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); see also
id. at 1009–10 (describing that the Court has not found freedom of expression to be protected in instances where
there are “(1) unlawful verbal acts, (2) obscenity, (3) child pornography, and (4) government speech”).
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standpoint.21 Within this dichotomy, speech is a “contemplation of engaging in
some action” and expression amounts to actual engagement in that action. 22 Under
this structure, the contemplation stage receives First Amendment protections,
whereas the conduct does not.23 The law considers conduct as fundamentally
different than speech and does not automatically provide the same protections it
does to speech.24
In the context of sharing footage of mass shootings, the “sharer” of footage
online intends to aid the shooter’s violent tirade. 25 The sharer’s actions are
analogous to aiding the actions of the shooter, likely breaching the line of speech
and becoming conduct.26 In actively reproducing the footage online, the sharer’s
conduct extends beyond typical First Amendment protection.27 Instead, this
conduct amounts to an affirmative intent to help the shooter carry out his act of
terror and justifies the extension of accomplice liability. 28 This Comment argues
that accomplice liability should extend to individuals who disseminate violent
footage a principal attacker initially publishes because the sharer is helping the
principal attacker complete their crime and not simply engaging in protected
speech.29
Part II describes the Christchurch attack and the actions of the sharers that led
to criminal charges.30 Part III examines international approaches to the regulation
of speech that depict violence and terror. 31 Part IV presents the limitations set by
First Amendment jurisprudence.32 Part V provides a brief introduction to the theory
of accomplice liability in the United States. 33 Part VI argues that a theory of aiding
and abetting is a preferable way to hold online sharers accountable for their
actions.34

21. Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427, 439 (2015).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra Section VI.A (discussing what sharers are doing to promote the offense of terror).
26. See Schauer, supra note 21, at 439 (describing the distinction between thinking about conduct and
actually engaging in the conduct).
27. See infra Part VI (illustrating the difference between freedom of speech and where the threshold for
accomplice liability may lie for those who disseminate footage online).
28. See United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing the requirements to find
an accomplice liable for aiding the principal actor); see also United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 753 (5th
Cir. 1993) (“[a] conviction [for aiding and abetting] ‘merely requires that [defendants’] association and
participation with the venture were in a way calculated to bring about that venture’s success.’”) (quoting United
States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1292 (5th Cir. 1992)).
29. See infra Part IV (describing the current strength and narrow ability for the government to regulated
speech in the United States).
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III.
32. Infra Part IV.
33. Infra Part V.
34. Infra Part VI.
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II. THE NEW ZEALAND ATTACK
New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, declared the March 15, 2019
events in Christchurch to be “one of New Zealand’s darkest days.” 35 Exemplifying
Prime Minister Ardern’s declaration are narrative accounts from the survivors of
the attack.36 One survivor of the attack attributed his survival to hiding under the
bodies of those already killed.37 Other victims witnessed the shooting of a father
and his daughter while sustaining bullet wounds themselves. 38 Undoubtedly, the
events of March 15, 2019, will remain in the minds of New Zealanders
indefinitely.39 Section A provides an overview of the moments leading up to and
during the Christchurch shooting.40 Section B summarizes the responses taken
online after the livestream ended.41
A. The Attack
Shortly before the carnage on the Muslim community in Christchurch began,
a twenty-eight-year-old Australian man posted on the Internet.42 Brenton Tarrant’s
8chan post declared that he believed it was time to carry out an attack. 43 Tarrant’s
choice to post to 8chan was likely not a random choice.44 8chan is an online forum
tied to racially fueled mass violence. 45 In 2019 alone, three mass shootings
occurred after posts filled with hate poured onto 8chan.46
On Tarrant’s 8chan posting, he provided a link to his manifesto and directions

35. Jacinda Ardern on the Christchurch Shooting: ‘One of New Zealand’s Darkest Days,’ THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/15/one-of-new-zealands-darkest-days-jacindaardern-responds-to-christchurch-shooting (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. Id.; see Sean Flynn, The Harrowing Hours and Defiant Aftermath of the New Zealand Mosque
Shootings, GQ (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/new-zealand-mosque-shooting-christchurch (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing a narrative of the events of the attack and the aftermath
in the days following).
37. Mohamad Abdalla, Finding Dignity and Grace in the Aftermath of the Christchurch Attack, THE
CONVERSATION (Mar. 22, 2019), https://theconversation.com/finding-dignity-and-grace-in-the-aftermath-of-thechristchurch-attack-114072 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
38. Id.
39. See Jacinda Ardern on the Christchurch Shooting: ‘One of New Zealand’s Darkest Days,’ supra note
35 (providing the Prime Minister’s response and description of the Christchurch attack).
40. Infra Section II.A.
41. Infra Section II.B.
42. Walden, supra note 2.
43. Macklin, supra note 13, at 18.
44. See Drew Harwell, Three Mass Shootings This Year Began with a Hateful Screed on 8chan. Its Founder
Calls It a Terrorist Refuge in Plain Sight., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019, 6:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/04/three-mass-shootings-this-year-began-with-hatefulscreed-chan-its-founder-calls-it-terrorist-refuge-plain-sight/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing 8chan’s prevalence with online extremists).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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to access his livestream.47 Tarrant’s post directed readers to “please do your part
spreading my message,” especially in the event he did not survive his attack.48
Tarrant’s seventy-four-page manifesto he linked to the livestream included strong
sentiment of neo-fascist ideology and anti-immigration rhetoric.49
Shortly after posting, Tarrant began his livestream and entered the first mosque
with a semi-automatic rifle where he subsequently opened fire.50 Upon concluding
his attack at the first mosque, Tarrant then drove three miles to a second mosque
and continued his massacre. 51 During the shooting, Tarrant’s livestream on
Facebook attracted an online audience.52 Some watched in horror and others in
support.53 One columnist described the attack and livestream “as almost an internet
performance.”54
The performative nature of Tarrant’s attack posed difficult questions for
journalists.55 Following the shooting, the international editor for the New York
Times described the actions of Tarrant as “using all of the power of social media
and the internet to spread his vile views.”56 In weighing how to cover the attack,
the editor described the need of the media to “avoid becoming the tools of a
terrorist” in light of Tarrant’s apparent coordination of online publications before,
during, and after the shooting.57 The media had to weigh coverage of a news event
worthy of global coverage against providing the shooter the platform and attention
he desired.58
47. Macklin, supra note 13, at 18; cf. id. (noting that Tarrant also sent a link to a generic email of the Prime
Minister indicating that he was preparing to carry out his attack).
48. Cf. id. at 19 (providing an argument that Tarrant’s goal was not to kill people of the Muslim faith, but
rather to make a video of someone killing Muslims).
49. Walden, supra note 2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Macklin, supra note 13, at 20.
53. See Christchurch Man Jailed for Sharing Video Footage of Massacre, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/18/christchurch-man-jailed-for-sharing-video-footage-ofmassacre (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that Arps described the live-stream
video as “awesome”); Macklin, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that Facebook users watching the attack did not report
it to Facebook for twenty-nine minutes).
54. Hanna Ingber, The New Zealand Attack Posed New Challenges for Journalists. Here Are the Decisions
the Times Made, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/reader-center/new-zealandmedia-coverage.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Macklin, supra note 13, at 20
(theorizing that “Tarrant grasped intuitively that digital technology could and would amplify his murderous
message, ensuring its projection far beyond the cloistered confines of the 8chan sub-thread on which it
originated”).
55. Ingber, supra note 54.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see Frank Shyong, Column: Mass Shooters Seek Notoriety, and We, the Media, Provide It. Is There
Another Way?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-11/massshooters-seek-notoriety-in-media (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the role of
the media in mass shootings and how it motivates the shooters to commit the act and the coverage inspires others
to carry out similar attacks).
58. Ingber, supra note 54; see Shyong, supra note 57 (describing the considerations that journalists need
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B. Internet Conduct in Relation to the Christchurch Shooting
Within a day of the shooting, Facebook removed approximately 1.5 million
videos of the Christchurch attack. 59 Of the 1.5 million videos, Facebook blocked
1.2 million videos using automated technology.60 Elsewhere online, users
“repackaged and re-cut” the video to “outsmart the platform’s detection system”
and put the video on other websites. 61 Comments users posted to online message
boards discussed saving the video to make it available for republication in the event
of removal from internet sites. 62 Estimates project that more than 800 “visually
distinct” uploaded videos circled the Internet. 63
One New Zealander now faces charges for his role in disseminating the video
online.64 After the attack, self-proclaimed white supremacist Philip Arps shared
the footage.65 Arps went out of his way to doctor the footage to include crosshairs
and a kill count.66 The footage he manipulated made it look as if the video was
from the perspective of a first-person shooter game.67
Arps’ purported goal of editing the livestream was to “lighten up the video and
make it a bit funny by making it into a meme that would then be shared on social
media.”68 Arps faces two counts of distribution of objectionable publications under
New Zealand’s “Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act”
(“Classification Act”). 69 Under the Classification Act, material is objectional when
it includes publications that promote “acts of torture or the infliction of extreme
violence or extreme cruelty” among other depictions. 70 The maximum penalty

to make when deciding how to cover mass shooting events).
59. Macklin, supra note 13, at 20.
60. Id.; see Issie Lapowsky, Why Tech Didn’t Stop the New Zealand Attack from Going Viral, WIRED (Mar.
15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/new-zealand-shooting-video-social-media/ (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how Facebook has been implementing and developing automated tools to
remove uploaded content that violates their policies).
61. Macklin, supra note 13, at 18.
62. Ingber, supra note 54.
63. Macklin, supra note 13, at 20.
64. New Zealander Jailed, supra note 6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Graham-McLay, supra note 15.
68. Jordan Oppert, Man Sent to Prison for 21 Months for Distributing Footage of Christchurch Terrorist
Attack Appealing His Sentence, 1 NEWS (June 17, 2019), https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/mansent-prison-21-months-distributing-footage-christchurch-terrorist-attack-appealing-his-sentence (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
69. David Clarkson & Anne Clarkson, Philip Arps Charged with Sharing Live Stream of Christchurch
Mosque
Massacre,
STUFF
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurchshooting/111425937/man-charged-with-sharing-live-stream-of-christchurch-mosque-massacre (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review); White Supremacist Philip Arps Has Second Appeal for Sharing Mosque
Shooting Video, STUFF (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/117493354/white-supremacistphilip-arps-has-second-appeal-for-sharing-mosque-shooting-video [hereinafter White Supremacist Philip Arps]
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
70. See Censorship and the Internet, DEP’T INTERNAL AFF., https://www.dia.govt.nz/Censorship-and-the-
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under the Classification Act is imprisonment for fourteen years. 71 Arps’ sentence
for his acts amounted to twenty-one months, including a range of post-release
conditions such as no internet access. 72
III. GLORIFICATION LAWS: NEW ZEALAND AND BEYOND
Internationally, governments have set guidelines and created laws that regulate
speech—specifically speech promoting or spreading messages by terrorists. 73
Section A details New Zealand’s Office of Censorship, particularly its response to
the Christchurch shooting.74 Section B discusses the United Kingdom’s 2006
Terrorism Act and other specific laws against the glorification of terror. 75 Section
C explores a new law Australia passed after the Christchurch shooting that
regulates the behavior of online platforms by holding the executives in charge of
such sites liable.76
A. New Zealand
Since 1892, various forms of censorship legislation monitor the conduct of
publications within New Zealand.77 Currently, New Zealand has an office
responsible for censoring online content.78 In 1993, the Classification Act in New
Zealand established the Office of Film and Literature Classification (“OFLC”).79
Today, the OFLC remains the office New Zealand charged with censoring and
classifying content.80 The OFLC’s purported purpose “is to prevent harm to the
Internet (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing other types
of objectionable material to include “exploitation of children or young persons for sexual purposes; use of
violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in sexual conduct; sexual conduct upon the body of a
dead person; use or urine or excrement in association with degrading or dehumanizing or sexual conduct . . . [and]
bestiality”).
71. Clarkson & Clarkson, supra note 69.
72. Oppert, supra note 68 (providing all of Arps’ post-release conditions including “psychiatric
assessments, no internet access and drug and alcohol treatment”).
73. See infra Sections III.A–C (discussing the laws and regulation by New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and Australia).
74. Infra Section III.A.
75. Infra Section III.B.
76. Infra Section III.C.
77. See History of Censorship in New Zealand, OFF. FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION,
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/about-nz-classification/history-of-censorship-in-new-zealand/
(last
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter History of Censorship]
(describing the history of classification laws in New Zealand from 1892 to present).
78. New Zealand’s Classification Law: The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act, 1993, OFF.
OF FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/about-nz-classification/newzealands-classification-law/ (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
[hereinafter New Zealand’s Classification Law].
79. Id.
80. History of Censorship, supra note 77.
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New Zealand public by restricting the availability of publications containing
harmful material.”81
Following the Christchurch attack, the OFLC released its decision on the
classification of the livestream.82 The OFLC found that the livestream was
objectionable and promoted “the infliction of extreme violence and cruelty.” 83 In
justifying the classification decision, the OFLC found that “the right to freedom of
expression . . . is subject ‘only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’” 84 After the OFLC
released its classification decision, journalists had to determine how to cover the
event while also complying with the OFLC’s classification decision.85 The
OFLC’s website attempted to provide guidance to the public on what to do with
the livestream footage.86 Despite the OFLC’s guidelines which provided little
direction to journalists, international news organizations began to make their own
determinations on what they could publish.87
Falling in line with the OFLC decision and the Classification Act, major news
outlets signed a pact to limit the coverage of Tarrant’s attack. 88 In this
unprecedented action, these outlets cited the desire to limit coverage “that actively
champion[s] white supremacist or terrorist ideology.”89 Concerned about public
reaction and the ability of general audiences to process and understand coverage,
the news outlets and the OFLC’s Chief Censor further justified restrictions on
publications as potentially “instructional” for future attacks. 90
B. United Kingdom
Building on previous contemporary terrorism laws, the United Kingdom
enacted the Terrorism Act 2006, following the 2005 terrorist bombings in
London.91 The Terrorism Act 2006 created a new offense that prohibits the
81. New Zealand’s Classification Law, supra note 78.
82. OFFICE OF FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION, OFLC REF. NO. 1900148.000, NOTICE OF DECISION
UNDER
SECTION
38(1):
CHRISTCHURCH
MOSQUE
ATTACK
LIVESTREAM
1
(2019),
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/assets/PDFs/Christchurch-Attack-Livestream-ClassificationDecision.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 8.
85. See Ingber, supra note 54 (discussing how the “unusual nature of the attack change[d] The Times’s
calculations around how to cover it”).
86. OFLC Responds to Christchurch – What You Can Do, OFF. FILM & LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION,
https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/news/latest-news/oflc-response-to-christchurch-what-you-can-do/ (last
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. Ingber, supra note 54; Jack Shafer, Why New Zealand’s Press Just Put on Blinders for Its Biggest
Story, POLITICO (May 1, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/01/self-censorship-medianew-zealand-white-supremacist-2019-226766 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
88. Shafer, supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1137,
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encouragement of terrorism. 92
The encouragement offense “applies to a statement that is likely to be
understood as a direct or indirect encouragement . . . of acts of terrorism.”93 The
offense requires the actor, at the time of publication of a statement, to either intend
to induce terror or be reckless in “directly or indirectly encourag[ing] . . . [members
of the public] to commit, prepare or instigate” terror. 94 Statements glorifying terror
or appearing to glorify terror are punishable under the encouragement offense. 95
Individuals found guilty of this charge face up to fifteen years in prison.96
In discussions leading up to a vote on the law, concerns existed that the law
would be overly broad in its criminalization of speech. 97 For example, opponents
raised concerns regarding the criminalization of speech “glorif[ying] the armed
opposition to the Apartheid regime in South Africa” or speech against Israel in
favor of Palestinians regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 98 Despite such
concerns, the law ultimately passed and remains in effect as a part of the United
Kingdom’s terror legislation.99
C. Australia
In the wake of the Christchurch aftermath, Australian lawmakers began taking
swift actions to stop the publication of the livestream footage on social media
sites.100 Armed with the threat of fines and jail time, the goal of Australia’s new
law is to hold the online website hosts liable for violent content posted online.101
The amendment to the Australian Criminal Code titled “Sharing of Abhorrent
Violent Material” works to “ensure that online platforms cannot be exploited and
weaponised by perpetrators of violence.”102 The new law defines “abhorrent
violent conduct” to include acts of terror, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape,
1137, 1141 (2006).
92. Id.
93. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1 (UK).
94. Id. at § 1(2)(b).
95. Id. at § 1(3).
96. Id. at § 1(7).
97. Walker, supra note 91, at 1141; see New Terror Law Comes into Force, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_politics/4905304.stm (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing concerns over glorification provision of the law being too broad).
98. Walker, supra note 91, at 1141–42; see New Terror Law Comes into Force, supra note 97 (quoting a
member of a human rights group discussing problems with the law that “[a]nyone supporting violence to remove
a regime anywhere in the world now or in the past would theoretically get caught up”).
99. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 1.
100. Damien Cave, Host Violent Content? In Australia, You Could Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/world/australia/internet-extremist-violence-christchurch.html (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
101. Id.
102. Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill
2019 (Cth) 3 (Austl.).
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and kidnapping.103 The law is applicable regardless of whether the conduct
occurred in Australia or elsewhere.104 It targets “internet service providers,”
providers of a “content service,” or providers of a “hosting service.” 105
Failure on the part of website hosts to remove and prevent the spread of
material can lead to imprisonment of company executives’ for up to three years
and fines up to 10% of the platform’s annual revenue.106 Australian lawmakers
believed the inaction of social media companies in the wake of the Christchurch
aftermath—citing Facebook in particular—failed to protect users from exposure to
dangerous online content.107
The Australian law appears to go further than any other countries’, holding
major websites accountable for failing to remove content others post online.108
Representatives of social media companies, including Facebook, feel the
government failed to consult relevant players in the digital industry before passing
this law.109 Skepticism shrouds the law, questioning how enforcement would work
and whether Australia will be able to hold executives accountable. 110
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Americans consider freedom of speech one of the most important rights the
United States Constitution provides.111 Speech in the United States functions
within the paradigm that speech operates in a marketplace of ideas. 112 One scholar
succinctly describes this freedom as “what it means to be a person . . . [i]t is what
it means to be a member of a functioning democracy . . . [a]nd it is what it means
to be an American.”113
While freedom of speech is one of the strongest protections the Bill of Rights

103. Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth) sch 1 s 474.32(1)
(Austl.).
104. Id. at § 474.33(1).
105. Id. at § 474.33(1)(a).
106. James Griffiths, Australia Passes Law to Stop Spread of Violent Content Online After Christchurch
Massacre, CNN (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/04/australia/australia-violent-video-social-medialaw-intl/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
107. Id.
108. Cave, supra note 100.
109. Griffiths, supra note 106.
110. See Evelyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law Is a Mess, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019, 8:28
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-law-mess (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (listing the concerns and questions about the Australian law including a question regarding
the effectiveness of the law).
111. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (describing freedom of expression as “the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom”).
112. See Sedler, supra note 20, at 1017 (theorizing “the primary function of the First Amendment is to
ensure that all ideas enter the marketplace of ideas and compete with one another, seeking to win acceptance by
the public as a whole”).
113. Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 380–82
(2004).
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affords, there are restrictions on this right.114 The following sections detail three of
the primary ways the Supreme Court limits the freedom of speech. 115 Section A
discusses the prohibition on content-based regulations of speech.116 Section B
presents the threshold that the Court has set for speech to qualify as inciting
violence.117 Section C examines the Court’s jurisprudence and limitations on hate
speech.118
A. Content-Based Regulations
Content-based regulation of speech occurs when the government abridges
speech based solely on the content of the speech.119 The Supreme Court held in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., Minnesota that content-based regulations of speech are
“presumptively invalid.”120 When a government, including state and local
governments, enact content-based regulations, the regulations must survive strict
scrutiny.121 To survive strict scrutiny in this context, the government regulation
must: “(1) advance compelling or overriding government ends; (2) be directly and
substantially related to advancing those ends; and (3) be the least restrictive,
effective means to advance the ends.”122
The Court declined to extend First Amendment protections to some types of
speech and expressive conduct.123 The limited areas of communication the First
Amendment does not protect include obscene speech, speech that is likely to incite
violence, and speech constituting fighting words. 124
Additionally, the Court has held that to create a category of unprotected
114. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (noting “[e]ven
protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times”).
115. Infra Sections IV.A–C.
116. Infra Section IV.A.
117. Infra Section IV.B.
118. Infra Section IV.C.
119. Sedler, supra note 20, at 1021.
120. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral
and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (describing the rigid scrutiny
that the government must overcome when trying to pass a content-based law as “almost always fatal”).
121. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)) (finding “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas
contained’ in the regulated speech”).
122. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate
Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 294 (2016); see generally id. at 293 (discussing
the different types of scrutiny applicable to different government actions within the context of free speech and
the First Amendment including intermediate scrutiny and reasonableness balancing).
123. Sedler, supra note 20, at 1009–10.
124. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (listing unprotected types of speech categories
to include incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child
pornography, fraud, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat that the government has the power
to prevent”).
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speech, a legislature cannot easily change the longstanding judgment of Americans
by deciding to not protect speech that has been traditionally deemed as acceptable
by society.125 The Court rejected a simple balancing test that “weigh[s] the value
of a particular category of speech against its social costs and then punishes that
category of speech if it fails the test.”126 A justification based only on this balancing
test is unlikely to outweigh the benefit that free speech provides to society.127
Absent evidence that a type of speech has a long-standing tradition of a lack of
acceptance in society, banishment, or regulation, the creation of new categories of
unprotected speech is not justified.128
B. Incitement to Violence
The standard set by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio provides the doctrine
under which speech qualifies as incitement to violence. 129 Under the Brandenburg
standard, speech is inciteful when “such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”130 Furthermore, the speaker must intend for such lawless action to result
from his or her communication.131
Brandenburg stands for the proposition that advocacy of illegal activity
through speech remains a protected form of speech.132 However, the law ceases to
protect speech when it reaches the point of inciting others to commit the same
act.133 Under Brandenburg, advocating for lawless action alone is insufficient to
render such speech incitement. 134 Rather, evidence must exist that the speaker
“intended to produce imminent lawless action.”135 So the requirements of
Brandenburg make it difficult for courts to successfully classify speech as inciteful
because it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to show specific intent in these
situations.136
125. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
130. Id.
131. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (describing the incitement framework and the requirement
that the “words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder” finding the state’s claim that
the speech had a “tendency to lead to violence” insufficient).
132. James Hart, Revisiting Incitement Speech, 38 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 111, 111 (2019).
133. See id. (arguing that the distinction between inciting and advocating should be abandoned).
134. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (overturning the statute at issue because it “purports to punish mere
advocacy”); Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 MISS. L.J. 1263, 1265 (2011)
(quoting Brandenburg) (describing the rejection of the criminalization of “subversive advocacy” by the Court in
Brandenburg).
135. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 W M. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2013)
(emphasis added).
136. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm
Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1169 (describing meeting the
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The underlying theory in Brandenburg is that speech can be persuasive enough
to convince another party to act.137 But to qualify speech as inciteful and impose
liability, the speech must be persuasive enough that a listener will hear it and then
quickly engage in the described lawless action.138 If the speech itself is not
persuasive, the listener is less likely to follow the speech’s directions. 139 This has
proven to be a difficult threshold to match.140
C. Hate Speech
Hate speech exists when expressive content is demeaning “on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age [or] disability.”141 The Court in Matal v. Tam
described the problem of regulating hate speech within the context of First
Amendment protections.142 In Matal, the Court held that the First Amendment
primarily protects “the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” 143 Hate
speech remains protected unless it rises beyond abstract advocacy and moves into
the realm of incitement. 144 Even speech that society considers hateful has
protection and is the “proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence.” 145
While hate speech receives First Amendment protections, hate crimes do
not.146 On the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) website, the DOJ notes that the
government cannot punish ideas and speech that are hateful. 147 The DOJ
emphasizes, however, that the protections of the First Amendment stop upon the

imminence requirement under Brandenburg as narrow and “address[ing] speech activity designed to persuade
someone to commit an unlawful act, not speech designed to facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a
person who has already decided to act”).
137. Clay Calvert, First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the Incitement-to-Violence Test with
Messrs. Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer, 51 CONN. L. REV. 117, 134 (2019).
138. Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1175, 1201 (2000).
139. Calvert, supra note 137, at 134.
140. See Chris Montgomery, Note, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of
Terrorism?: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 144 (2009) (arguing the
Brandenburg doctrine “is in serious danger of sliding into obsolescence”).
141. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).
142. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
143. Id. at 1764 (quoting Holmes, J., dissenting in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929));
see, e.g., id. at 1751 (describing the underlying speech in this case which was an “a dance-rock band’s application
for federal trademark registration of the band’s name, ‘The Slants’” and Justice Alito’s description of the
controversy of the term being the term “slants” as “a derogatory term for persons of Asian descent”).
144. See Vitiello, supra note 138, at 1177 (suggesting the societal costs that are a result of the strong First
Amendment protection of hate speech).
145. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Holmes, J., dissent, United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
655 (1929)).
146. Learn About Hate Crimes, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-about-hate-crimes
(last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter Learn About Hate
Crimes].
147. Id.
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commission of an actual crime. 148 When hateful beliefs motivate a crime, the law
does not protect those motivations, even if the underlying motive’s basis is in
“philosophical beliefs.”149 The effects of these crimes drive the justification for
having a set of laws that punish hate crimes. 150 A different type of crime, for
example, a simple assault, may only impact the individuals directly involved and
those close around them.151 However, hate crimes may impact a broader
community, with potential harm even expanding nationally.152
V. AIDING AND ABETTING
Aiding and abetting is a form of derivative liability where a principal actor
violates the law, and a secondary actor—an accomplice—contributes to the
principal’s acts.153 To find a secondary actor liable, the principal must violate the
law, and the secondary actor must engage in an intentional act to help the
principal.154 The intentional act justifies assigning blame to the secondary party.155
The premise of extending liability to the accomplice from the acts of the principal
is the idea “that the accomplice has a stake in the principal’s acts,” desiring for the
underlying crime’s completion and aiding the principal to reach that goal.156
Applying this theory to the New Zealand attack, the shooter would be the principal,
and the sharer would be the accomplice.157
Created by the American Law Institute, the Model Penal Code (“MPC”)
“play[s] an important part in the widespread revision and codification of the
substantive criminal law of the United States.” 158 Serving as a baseline for this
Comment, courts across the United States frequently look to the MPC for guidance

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Georgina Fuller, The Serious Impact and Consequences of Physical Assault, AUSTRALIAN INST.
CRIMINOLOGY (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi496 (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
152. Learn About Hate Crimes, supra note 146.
153. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 323, 337 (1985).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the
Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1998) (addressing the proper extent of a secondary actor’s
criminal culpability).
157. See How Are People Charged as an Accomplice?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/howare-people-charged-as-an-accomplice-35892 (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing the relationship between the accomplice and the principal as “the main perpetrator of a
crime is referred to as a principal while the individuals assisting in the commission of the crime are referred to as
accomplices”).
158. Model Penal Code, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/publications/show/model-penal-code/ (last visited
June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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while making decisions.159 The MPC defines accomplice liability as having “the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.”160 An
accomplice shows purpose by aiding or agreeing to aid the principal in such acts.161
The purpose prong of accomplice liability under the MPC requires a higher level
of culpability than in other jurisdictions.162
Under common law, the threshold for accomplice liability was low. 163
Generally, an actor could face liability for aiding the principal so long as the
“accomplice did ‘something’ to aid the crime.”164 There was no requirement that
the accomplice’s liability match the liability of the principal actor. 165
The MPC recognizes four degrees of culpability.166 Depending on the offense
and the required degree of culpability, the MPC requires that the actor had the
requisite culpability concerning a material element of the offense. 167 The highest
degree of culpability is when an actor acts purposely with the “conscious
object[ive] to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result” with
“respect to an element of the offense.” 168 To find an accomplice liable, the MPC
typically requires a finding that the accomplice acted with purpose.169
Alternatively, MPC § 2.06(4) provides that accomplice liability extends where
“causing a particular result is an element of an offense.” 170 For example, to find
actors guilty of criminal homicide, their conduct must have led to a human’s
death.171
Some states have specific laws that lower the level of mental culpability
required for accomplice liability in the context of certain crimes. 172 For example,
New York’s general accomplice liability statute requires the accomplice to have
159. Id.
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii).
162. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (describing a purpose requirement), with WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.08.020 (2019) (listing a knowledge requirement for liability for the conduct of another).
163. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 72–73 (2014).
164. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing R. DESTY, A COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW § 37A, at
106 (1882)).
165. Kadish, supra note 153, at 339.
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)–(2)(a)(i).
169. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating that a
person is an accomplice if he or she acts “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense”).
170. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4); see Sherif Girgis, Comment, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability:
Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460, 467 (2013) (describing the requirement of intending a lethal result for
an accomplice actor to be liable for first degree murder).
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring
fatality of a human for criminal homicide to occur).
172. See Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1409–10
(2016) (describing areas of the law where complicity for certain crimes, like dog fighting, drops to a knowing
requirement where the general accomplice liability statute requires purpose).
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the same degree of mental culpability as the principal actor. 173 However, New York
has a specific law addressing prostitution and a specific provision for accomplice
liability within the context of prostitution.174 When an individual works to advance
prostitution, the degree of required mental culpability the law requires is only
“knowingly.”175 New York’s laws serve as a helpful illustration to show how states
can pair a specific mens rea requirement to a specific crime while maintaining a
general accomplice liability statute. 176
Accomplice liability also requires that the secondary actor act with intent. 177
When the secondary actor provides aid or encouragement to the principal actor to
help in the furtherance of a crime, the secondary actor is acting and meets the intent
requirement.178 Common examples of courts extending accomplice liability are
when the accomplice acts as a “look-out, or drive[s] the getaway car, or hold[s] a
ladder” to help the primary actor in the execution of the crime. 179
Those opposing imposition of accomplice liability cite the derivative nature of
the doctrine.180 For liability to extend to an accomplice, culpability begins with a
primary actor, and the accomplice’s assistance or contribution to the primary
actor’s conduct creates the extension.181 Because the accomplice is liable as a result
of the principal’s actions, an argument exists that an element of the overriding
criminal law principles is lacking: a requirement of personal wrongdoing.182
Although the liability is derivative, the law does not impose liability without the
secondary actor also acting.183 Thus, even though the principal and the accomplice
have a relationship, accomplice liability is not a form of vicarious liability. 184

173. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 2019).
174. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15 (McKinney 2019).
175. Id.
176. See PENAL § 20.00 (providing New York’s accomplice liability statute).
177. Kadish, supra note 153, at 346.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 345.
180. Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129, 129 (2013).
181. Kadish, supra note 153, at 337.
182. Heyman, supra note 180, at 129.
183. Kadish, supra note 153, at 345.
184. See id. (debunking an argument that accomplice liability is a form of vicarious liability); see also
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 4:1 (Monique C. M. Leahy ed., 2020) (defining the
underpinnings of vicarious liability as a “form of social policy adjustment under which, even though a person to
whom wrongdoing of another is imputed is him or herself personally without fault, legal public policy renders
that person nevertheless liable (a form of strict liability)”).
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VI. AIDING AND ABETTING BY SHARING
Attackers have now streamed their videos twice for the world to see.185 Hours
after the October 9, 2019 attack in Germany, initial investigations found there was
a coordinated effort on messaging services to share the video of the attack
online.186 These coordinated attempts to aid the shooter in spreading the shooter’s
message crosses the First Amendment threshold of speech and turns into action,
sustaining an aiding and abetting charge. 187 Section A presents arguments in
support of finding sharers liable under accomplice liability. 188 Section B outlines
the restraints that American First Amendment jurisprudence places on courts’
ability to hold sharers liable for their speech. 189 Section C presents an illustration
of how sharing a video could amount to accomplice liability. 190
A. Why Should the United States Punish Republication?
Within United States criminal law, some laws punish criminal actions because
of the harm they cause, rather than the message they convey.191 For example,
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct constitutes “child
sexual exploitation.”192 In explaining the justification for child pornography laws,
the DOJ describes the irreparable harm the production of such pornography
causes.193 Further, the DOJ describes how the Internet has exacerbated the
problem.194 First, child pornography is easily accessible and distributable to those
seeking to find the content online on various forums. 195 Second, the online
communities seeking sexually exploitive content online find solace in one
another.196 And third, this community support desensitizes offenders to the harm
they cause and erodes the shame that usually accompanies this behavior. 197
Congress has also worked to pass laws that make animal cruelty a crime,

185. See Germany Shooting: 2,200 People Watched on Twitch, supra note 7 (describing the stream in both
Germany and New Zealand).
186. Id.
187. See infra Section VI.A. (arguing that accomplice liability is an appropriate offense to charge the sharer
of a video with).
188. Infra Section VI.B.
189. Infra Section VI.C.
190. Infra Section VI.A.
191. Volokh, supra note 172, at 1409–12 (noting areas of the law that look to the harms caused by the acts,
rather than the speech).
192. Child Pornography, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/child-pornography (last
visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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focusing specifically on animal crush videos.198 In 2010, Congress passed a law
that attempted “to criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of
certain depictions of animal cruelty.”199 Later, the Court in United States v. Stevens
declared the law as overly broad as written. 200 However, Justice Samuel Alito’s
dissenting opinion signaled what he believed to be the challenged law’s purpose.201
He stated that the law was “enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific
acts of animal cruelty . . . [and the videos are] a form of depraved entertainment
that has no social value.”202 Further, Justice Alito suggested that someone
recording the act is “likely to be criminally culpable, either as aiders and abettors
or conspirators.”203
In response to the desire for an animal cruelty law, Congress recently passed
the Preventing Animal Cruelty Act (“PACT”). 204 Under PACT, the act of animal
crushing is now illegal.205 PACT received widespread support on the online
petition platform Change.org, where nearly 800,000 people signed the petition in
support of the bill.206 PACT is not concerned with the motivation behind the
abuser.207 Rather, PACT works to hold those abusing animals liable when the
“abuse is intentional and unjustified.”208
The United States has considered the negative and undesirable results of child
pornography and animal cruelty and made the decision to make such conduct
illegal.209 In comparing the content of animal cruelty (i.e., depicting the harming
and killing of animals) to depictions of humans killed in a mass shooting, it is likely

198. Richard Gonzales, Trump Signs Law Making Cruelty to Animals a Federal Crime, NPR (Nov. 25,
2019, 11:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/25/782842651/trump-signs-law-making-cruelty-to-animals-afederal-crime (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West 2019)
(providing the recently enacted law for animal crush videos); see also What is “Animal Crushing?”,
COEXISTENCE ANIMAL RTS. ON EARTH (Dec. 30, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://careanimalrights.org/2016/12/what-isanimal-crushing/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining animal crushing as “the brutal
act of torturing animals . . . [v]ideos often feature women in high heels stepping on small animals and crushing
them”).
199. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 482 (Alito, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 494.
204. Gonzales, supra note 198.
205. Bill Chappell, Animal Cruelty as a Federal Crime: Trump Is Expected to Sign Bill Passed by
Congress, NPR (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/777280602/trump-is-expected-to-sign-billmaking-animal-cruelty-a-federal-crime (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
206. Id.
207. Courtney G. Lee, The PACT Act: A Step in the Right Direction on the Path to Animal Welfare, JURIST
(Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/12/courtney-lee-pact-act/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
208. Id.
209. See Chappell, supra note 205 (describing the bipartisan support of PACT due to the fact that
“Americans care about animal welfare”); DEP’T JUST., supra note 192 (describing the lasting harms that are the
result of sexual exploitation of children).
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that a law regulating the footage of humans being killed would have support.210
Following the reasoning in Justice Alito’s dissent in Stevens, he stated that “[i]t is
undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush videos may constitutionally be
prohibited.”211 The same logic applies to shooting videos where, undoubtedly, the
United States Constitution prohibits the conduct of murdering people.212
The law does not regulate depictions of animal cruelty and child pornography
because of the speech, but rather the underlying harm those acts cause. 213 The
extension of liability from the shooter to the sharer of the video under a theory of
accomplice liability advances similar policies. 214
In a recent case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of
liability on a young woman who encouraged her boyfriend to take his own life. 215
The woman was not physically present at the time the teen committed suicide, but
sent dozens of messages encouraging her boyfriend to go through with the act.216
The defense argued the woman did not commit an affirmative, physical act
contributing to the death.217 The Massachusetts Supreme Court ignored the
argument that the girlfriend’s presence—only remote—was insufficient to sustain
the charge.218 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari regarding the
young woman’s appeal, despite the argument that the decision violated her First
Amendment rights.219 She received a fifteen-month prison sentence.220 This
Massachusetts case exemplifies an instance where the speech of an actor amounts
210. See Chappell, supra note 205 (noting broad public support in a law protecting animal welfare).
211. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 491 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
212. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (describing the
crime of criminal homicide).
213. See Lee, supra note 207 (describing the PACT Act’s movement towards criminalizing the act of
animal cruelty); DEP’T JUST., supra note 192 (reporting the lasting harms that impact victims of childhood sexual
exploitation).
214. See, e.g., DEP’T INTERNAL AFF., supra note 70 (listing the content that is defined as objectionable
under New Zealand law to include child pornography, bestiality and acts depicting extreme violence).
215. Eric Levenson, Michelle Carter, Convicted in Texting Suicide Case, Released from Prison, CNN (Jan.
23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/us/michelle-carter-text-suicide-release/index.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review); Spencer Buell, Michelle Carter’s Texting Suicide Case Went All the Way
to the Supreme Court. Now It’s Over, BOS. MAG. (Jan. 13, 2020, 11:26 AM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2020/01/13/supreme-court-michelle-carter/ (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
216. All the Texts Between Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy the Day He Died, BOS. 25 NEWS (July 9,
2019),
https://www.boston25news.com/news/all-the-text-messages-between-michelle-carter-and-conrad-roythey-day-he-died/532942907/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
217. Carla Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide Manslaughter?, 47 SETON
HALL. L. REV. 279, 304 (2016).
218. Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 572 (Mass. 2019).
219. Ariane de Vogue & Devan Cole, Supreme Court Won’t Take Up Appeal of Michelle Carter’s
Conviction
for
Role
in
Boyfriend’s
Suicide,
CNN
(Jan.
13,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/13/politics/supreme-court-michelle-carter-boyfriend-suicide/index.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 570 (presenting the analysis ruling that
Carter did not have a viable First Amendment claim to rebut the charge of involuntary manslaughter).
220. De Vogue, supra note 219.
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to conduct because the text messages she sent were both “objectively and
subjectively reckless,” sustaining the involuntary manslaughter conviction.221 The
outcome in the Massachusetts case follows a recent trend of charging those who
encourage suicide with manslaughter.222 It is not the words that are said that justify
the imposition of liability, but rather the harm that is the result of conduct—i.e.,
the end of another person’s life.223
Online, the rejection of traditional social norms occurs as speakers feel
heightened protection both from distance and the shield of a screen, where they are
unlikely to face repercussions for their actions.224 To some, technology may
present the perfect platform to commit a crime and conduct themselves in a manner
in which they would not carry themselves in face-to-face interactions.225
Furthermore, legislation and Supreme Court decisions are unlikely to address hate
speech produced on the Internet in part because the Internet operates outside of a
single jurisdiction.226 However, the holding in Matal v. Tam remains controlling
precedent, leaving hate speech a protected form of expression in the United
States.227 Matal’s holding, however, does not protect crimes that hate motivates.228
But even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) makes clear on its webpage
that “[h]ate itself is not a crime—and the FBI is mindful of protecting freedom of
speech.”229
Policing the presence of violent content on the Internet raises multiple
problems.230 First, the Internet presents jurisdictional issues.231 Questions continue
221. Zavala, supra note 217, at 303.
222. Id. at 310.
223. See id. (explaining that the common law of manslaughter imposed liability for any conduct that was
reckless of the probable harmful consequences).
224. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hate Speech in Cyberspace, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 322
(2014).
225. See Ashley B. Chin, Comment, Suicide by Text: The Case of Michelle Carter, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
261, 261 (2017) (stating that “the use of technology to commit crime has become an ideal way for some”).
226. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 224, at 327–28 n. 55 (discussing the reasons why hate speech
on the Internet is likely to continue to evade review and legislation to address its impacts); see also Farzad
Damania, The Internet: Equalizer of Freedom of Speech? A Discussion on Freedom of Speech on the Internet in
the United States and India, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 243, 246–48 (2002) (illustrating some of the problems
associated with regulating speech when conduct can occur outside of a single jurisdiction).
227. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).
228. See Hate Crimes, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes (last visited June 6,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining a hate crime as “criminal offense against
a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity”).
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Bertrand De La Chapelle & Paul Fehlinger, Jurisdiction on the Internet: How to Move
Beyond the Legal Arms Race, OBSERVER RES. FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.orfonline.org/expertspeak/jurisdiction-on-the-internet/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the
jurisdictional problems that arise when balancing the need for legal systems to act while still respecting the
sovereignty of other nations).
231. See Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, 4 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 1, 3 (2004) (describing some of the problems when establishing what jurisdiction would be proper to litigate a
crime that took place on the Internet).
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to exist regarding what may establish jurisdiction for crimes committed online. 232
Speech disseminated on the Internet can instantaneously extend beyond
jurisdictional boundaries.233 Second, the Internet supports the deterioration of
societal norms.234 In both the context of hate speech and child pornography, there
is a growing acceptance of views and speech that society has historically
shamed.235
With the advent of the Internet, hate speech spreads more readily and leaves
lasting impacts.236 Minority groups in the United States have reported a rise in both
hate speech on the Internet and hate crimes.237 The way individuals propagate hate
speech online is different than spoken hate speech. 238 When someone says
something hateful aloud, it does not remain in a published online world; it goes
away.239 The reality of online speech is that words, thoughts, and ideas online are
more permanent.240 They are a reminder of the hate that exists towards certain
groups or individuals.241
Following mass shootings in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio, The
Washington Post called for the incitement framework to apply and for enforcement
of online speech to occur.242 However, when a court categorizes speech as inciteful,
what is the appropriate punishment for the speaker? 243 The Washington Post author
correctly notes that it would require the courts to draw lines at what is imminent
and when speech becomes likely to incite imminent lawless action. 244 However,
the author underestimates the intra-jurisdictional problems that speech presents
and the additional issues stemming from punishing speech for the sake of obtaining
232. Id.
233. De La Chapelle & Fehlinger, supra note 230.
234. See Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age,
75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1044–45 (2016) (describing in an example how the Internet is different and produces
different effects than what a pre-Internet world would have reacted to someone taking sugar packets and emptying
the salt and pepper shakers into a purse).
235. See Michael S. Waltman, The Normalizing of Hate Speech and How Communication Educators
Should Respond, 67 COMM. EDUC. 259, 260–61 (2018) (describing the increasing amounts of hate speech present
in American politics and the normalization of such rhetoric); DEP’T JUST., supra note 192 (shedding light on the
promotion of communication and collaboration between child pornography creators creating a “relationship
premised on a shared sexual interest in children” which works against the traditional shame that would be
associated).
236. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 224, at 320.
237. Id. at 319.
238. Id. at 323.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Danielle Allen & Richard Ashby Wilson, The Rules of Incitement Should Apply To – and Be Enforced
on
–Social
Media,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
8,
2019,
1:41
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/08/can-speech-social-media-incite-violence/ (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
243. See id. (describing incitement as an inchoate crime).
244. Id.
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judicial line-drawing.245
Holding sharers liable under a theory of aiding and abetting would not impose
liability on someone who shares a video for the sake of reporting on an event.246
Rather, by holding the sharer liable for his active role in helping a shooter share
his message, the derivative liability comes from the principal by the sharer’s goal
to aid the principal.247
The reality is that the Internet provides a different type of forum—raising a
multitude of issues that our Founding Fathers could not have predicted. 248 The
speed of dissemination of information on the Internet and the ability to protect
anonymity makes the Internet a breeding ground for content that society has oft
rejected.249 Looking at the conduct of the sharer not as one who speaks but as one
who helps in the principal’s terror campaign addresses the limits of the Internet. 250
B. Overinclusive First Amendment Jurisprudence?
As discussed above, the First Amendment offers broad protections to speakers,
even when their speech is unpopular.251 The First Amendment protects publication
of crimes that are likely to later attract a “copycat” who will attempt or carry out a
similar crime in a similar way.252 This protection exists despite the inherent dangers

245. See Damania, supra note 226, at 246–48 (describing the difficulties inherent in trying to regulate
conduct that occurs over the Internet, specifically, jurisdictional issues); Joshua Spector, Spreading Angst or
Promoting Free Expression? Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 10 U. MIAMI INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 155,
156 (2001) (illustrating some of the dangers that may occur with judicial review and the implicit subjective
elements when evaluating speech).
246. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(c) (3d ed. 2019) (explaining for
an accomplice to be liable “the accomplice must intend that his acts have the effect of assisting or encouraging
another”).
247. See Kadish, supra note 153, at 336–37 (illustrating the derivative nature of accomplice liability and
the requirement that the accomplice intentionally assists the principal).
248. See Olivia Waring, When Was the Internet Invented?, METRO NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018, 1:12 PM),
https://metro.co.uk/2018/03/22/when-was-the-internet-invented-7408002/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (indicating that the Internet was available for commercial public use in 1989); About the
Founding Fathers, CONSTITUTIONFACTS.COM, https://www.constitutionfacts.com/us-founding-fathers/aboutthe-founding-fathers/ (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(illustrating that James Madison was the last living Founding Father, having died in 1836).
249. See Michael Grothaus, Facebook: Original Christchurch Shooting Video Had 200 Live Views and
4,000 Total Views, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90321977/facebookoriginal-new-zealand-shooting-video-had-200-live-views-and-4000-total-views (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (illustrating how rapidly the shooting video spread).
250. See New Zealand Man Jailed for 21 Months for Sharing Christchurch Shooting Video, BBC (June
18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48671837 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (illustrating the actions that Arps took by sending the video to thirty people and requesting for cross hairs
and a kill count to be added to the footage).
251. See supra Part IV (describing the value in First Amendment protections and the wide breadth of
speech that protected under the First Amendment).
252. David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1994).
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of copycats, illustrating the strength of the First Amendment.253 The incitement
framework as illustrated in Brandenburg is too narrow to extend to the
republication of shooter videos on the Internet as inciting imminent lawless
action.254 The requirement for imminence under Brandenburg is too far removed
from the online sharing of videos.255
In practice, the requirements set out in Brandenburg are difficult to apply.256
Courts must evaluate whether harm is likely, which is difficult even from the
Internet.257 The rate at which content spreads online and the masses of people who
instantaneously have access to postings presents a greater question for courts to
determine: at which point does the likelihood of harm cross the threshold of
incitement?258 Further, the imminence requirement of Brandenburg poses another
question: is it imminent from the time of posting or from the time the reader reads
it?259 The Court has not addressed the temporal nature of the imminence
requirement, but there is a suggestion that speech would need to show “at least
some . . . temporal imminence.”260 If the imminence requirement includes acts that
253. Id.; see John Annese, NYPD Terrorism Big Who Busted Wannabe Zodiac Killer in the 90s Retires,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:51 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-terrorism-big-bustedwannabe-zodiac-killer-retires-article-1.3539659 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing the actions of Heriberto “Eddie” Sada who was a copycat killer, mirroring the style of the killings
committed by the Zodiac Killer who killed in San Francisco); see also Andrew Osborn, ‘Scream’ Movies Are
Blamed
by
Teenage
Girl’s
Copycat
Killer,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
18,
2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/18/filmnews.film (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (detailing the acts of Theirry Jaradin who took inspiration from the movie “Scream” while stabbing and
killing a fifteen-year-old girl, dressed in a costume similar to the one worn by the actor in the “Scream” film); cf.
Macklin, supra note 13, at 22 (noting that Tarrant likely studied the “modus operandi” of terrorist Anders Breivik
when preparing to carry out his own attack, citing Breivik as his inspiration).
254. See Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a
Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 67
(2002) (describing more generally the issues with the feasibility of Brandenburg’s framework being operational
on the internet).
255. See Weaver, supra note 134, at 1278 (alteration in original) (presenting the argument that “[t]he
requirement of imminence suggests a higher level of immediacy, and it is not clear that many Internet publications
are likely to cause imminent lawless conduct”).
256. See Hart, supra note 132, at 115 (explaining the difficulty with applying Brandenburg lies in the
reality that “[w]e cannot judge what harm is likely with hindsight, because life unfolds in real time”).
257. See id. (describing the difficult task of determining when speech would meet the incitement
framework as established by Brandenburg).
258. See Meagan Flynn, No One Who Watched New Zealand Shooter’s Video Live Reported It to
Facebook,
Company
Says,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
19,
2019)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/19/new-zealand-mosque-shooters-facebook-live-stream-wasviewed-thousands-times-before-being-removed/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing that 4,000 people had viewed Tarrant’s livestream of Facebook before the site was able to remove the
video); see also Hart, supra note 132, at 115 (describing how in application, the incitement test makes it difficult
for courts to determine the likelihood of harm).
259. See Andee Gale, How Long Does Your Information Stay on the Internet?, DIGITAL JOURNEY (July
22, 2015), http://digitalresources.nz/article/5yoLEjc (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(illustrating another element complicating the internet is the reality that “[t[he Internet is forever . . . even when
you think it’s gone”).
260. Calvert, supra note 137, at 132.
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follow speech closely in time, how can courts properly apply the imminence
standard when posts on the Internet remain online indefinitely?261 If the online
postings amount to hate speech, the First Amendment jurisprudence protects that
speech as well.262
Any laws drafted to criminalize the glorification of terror, as other countries
have done, would require extreme drafting precision.263 Such laws would be
content-based, requiring them to survive strict scrutiny.264 Glorification laws,
under First Amendment jurisprudence, also run the risk of being overly broad. 265
Furthermore, laws punishing glorification would likely cause a chilling effect
on speech.266 Such a chilling effect was at the center of concerns leading up to the
passage of the United Kingdom’s 2006 Terrorism Act. 267 Where glorification laws
exist, they run the risk of criminalizing speech that is political in nature, such as
when there is support for groups trying to overturn political systems. 268 There is
value in protecting speech that is unpopular or that represents a minority
viewpoint.269 In fact, Brandenburg’s incitement test partly exists to provide
protection to political speech—protecting minority political views and criticism of
the government.270
The COVID-19 outbreak is an illustrative example of the dangers of silencing
minority opinions.271 At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in China,

261. Id. at 132–33; Gale, supra note 259.
262. See generally Section IV.C. (discussing that hate speech is protected under the First Amendment).
263. See Michael C. Shaughnessy, Comment, Praising the Enemy: Could the United States Criminalize
the Glorification of Terror Under an Act Similar to the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2006?, 113 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 923, 980 (2009) (noting that the framework of Brandenburg would make it difficult for a glorification of
terror law to pass muster under the incitement framework).
264. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011) (describing
laws that must survive strict scrutiny “requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest”) (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
265. See Kendrick, supra note 135, at 1653 (describing that an overly broad law is “invalid not because it
incidentally chills protected expression but because it directly reaches protected expression”).
266. See id. at 1652 (explaining that a chilling effect often is the result of “uncertainty in the legal process”
and when speech gets closer to the “line” of unprotected speech, persons are less likely to communicate).
267. See New Terror Law Comes into Force, supra note 97 (citing concerns about the chilling effect of the
2006 glorification laws).
268. Walker, supra note 91, at 1141; New Terror Law Comes into Force, supra note 97.
269. See Elliot Hannon, Rare Public Anger in China After Silenced Doctor Who Warned of Coronavirus
Dies of the Virus, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2020, 10:39 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/china-doctor-lidies-coronavirus-whistleblower-public-anger-dissent.amp (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(recounting how the Chinese government silenced Doctor Li’s warnings of what would become COVID-19 as an
“illegal rumor” and how this has harmed millions).
270. JoAnne Sweeny, Incitement in the Era of Trump and Charlottesville, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 585, 594
(2019).
271. See Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, Critics Say China Has Suppressed and Censored Information in
Coronavirus
Outbreak,
OR.
PUB.
BROADCASTING
(Feb.
19,
2020,
8:50
AM),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/npr-critics-say-china-has-suppressed-and-censored-information-incoronavirus-outbreak/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating that a delayed response
may have made the outbreak in China worse).
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Chinese officials silenced a medical doctor when the doctor began to report on the
suspected outbreak.272 For the first four weeks of the outbreak, Chinese officials
attempted to minimize how severe the disease was. 273 Even in the wake of
widespread anger following the death of the doctor, China has remained steadfast
in silencing speech that criticizes its handling of the virus.274 Officials suspended
accounts on WeChat, an application with many users in China, that discussed the
outbreak and that potentially communicated criticisms of the government’s
handling of the outbreak.275 It is possible that the delayed reaction of Chinese
officials to mitigate the spread at the start of the outbreak made the extent of the
virus worse.276 The Chinese Government’s reaction to suppress the speech
underscores and exemplifies the real-world consequences of suppressing
speech.277
In short, absent a Supreme Court ruling that glorification of terror is a specific
area of speech that no longer has First Amendment protection, glorification laws
are likely incompatible with current First Amendment jurisprudence.278 There also
remains a question—even if First Amendment jurisprudence changed—with the
potential dangers inherent in glorification laws.279 While the spread of terror online
is undoubtedly dangerous, there is a concern that glorification laws would “limit
or silence legitimate reporting or criticism.” 280 Broadly drafted glorification laws
run the risk of penalizing media outlets that provide valuable information to the
public about current events.281

272. Hannon, supra note 269.
273. Feng & Cheng, supra note 271.
274. Hannon, supra note 269.
275. Feng & Cheng, supra note 271.
276. Julia Belluz, China Hid the Severity of Its Coronavirus Outbreak and Muzzled Whistleblowers —
Because It Can, VOX (Feb. 10, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/10/21124881/coronavirusoutbreak-china-li-wenliang-world-health-organization (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
277. See id. (describing the impact of delayed response and “muzzling” whistleblowers); cf. Jeff John
Roberts, China’s Coronavirus Propaganda Has Shifted Dramatically, Report Finds, FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2020,
4:49 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/03/30/china-coronavirus-propaganda-has-shifted-dramatically/ (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (examining trends in Chinese state media propaganda surrounding news
about the Coronavirus and the presence of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns about the global pandemic).
278. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (noting the need for a history of
proscription to recognize a category of speech as unworthy of First Amendment protections).
279. Misuse of Anti-Terror Legislation Threatens Freedom of Expression, COUNCIL EUR.: COMMISSIONER
FOR HUM. RTS. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/misuse-of-anti-terror-legislationthreatens-freedom-of-expression (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
280. Id.
281. Id.
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C. How Sharing a Video Facilitates the Crime of the Attacker
The United States Code defines acts of terror as “violent acts or acts dangerous
to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States” with
the intent to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population.”282 Tarrant’s deadly
actions, which he targeted at the Muslim community, paired with his online
manifesto would unquestionably intimidate the Muslim population.283 Further,
Tarrant’s desire to extend his carnage beyond the four walls of the mosque
continued his act of terror onto the Internet.284
At its core, the basis for extending liability to those who aid and abet a
principal actor requires the accomplice’s engagement in an “intentional action
designed to persuade or help.”285 Further justification for extending liability in this
circumstance stems from the idea that “knowledge that aid will be given can
influence the principal’s decision to go forward.”286 In response to a call to action,
such as Tarrant’s call to “spread his message,” a sharer intentionally engages in an
action desired by the principal actor.287 Further, when sharers act to manipulate a
video, as exhibited in New Zealand, they no longer are passively sharing a video.288
The extra step of manipulating a video to overcome blocks on social media is
evidence that the sharer took an active role in becoming a part of the mass terror
campaign, continuing to intimidate and terrorize the subjects of the principal’s
hatred.289
In instances like the New Zealand shooting, it appears the principal actor takes
282. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West 2019) (containing both the definition for domestic and international
terrorism, illustrating that the acts that Tarrant committed had them been committed in the United States and acts
outside of the United States would fall within the definition of the act); Macklin, supra note 13, at 19 (describing
the anti-Muslin rhetoric and killings of Tarrant).
283. Macklin, supra note 13, at 19.
284. See id. at 18 (providing the steps that Tarrant took to ensure that his rhetoric, as well as his act of
terror continued to live on after the attack subsided).
285. Kadish, supra note 153, at 337.
286. Id. at 342.
287. See Exobox Techs. Corp. v. Tsambis, No. 2:14-CV-00501-RFB-VCF, 2015 WL 82886, at *4 (D.
Nev. Jan. 6, 2015) (describing the nature of an intentional act within the context of posting messages online);
Macklin, supra note 13, at 19 (detailing Tarrant’s requests online for others to share his messages that he had
posted on both Facebook and 8chan).
288.
Compare
Manipulate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/manipulating?src=search-dict-hed (last visited June 6, 2020) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (defining manipulate as “to change by artful or unfair means so as to serve one’s
purpose”), with Share, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/share (last visited
June 6, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining share as “to distribute on the
Internet” and “to post (something) on a social media platform”), and Jack Stubbs, Viral Visuals Driving Social
Media Manipulation on YouTube, Instagram: Researchers, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 10:08 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-disinformation/viral-vi. . .l-media-manipulation-on-youtubeinstagram-researchers-idUSKBN1WB0ED (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing
the actions of the sharers and uploaders of the videos online).
289. Compare Macklin, supra note 13, at 18 (describing the request made by Tarrant to continue to spread
his message online), with New Zealander Jailed, supra note 6 (describing the actions that Arps took to continue
to spread the video online, including the manipulation of the footage to include crosshairs and a kill count).
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actions to ensure the dissemination of the attack online.290 Tarrant posted on 8chan
about ten to twenty minutes before the attack.291 Tarrant directed others on the
forum when he requested readers to “please do your part spreading my
message.”292 When the sharer Arps manipulated and shared the video, following
Tarrant’s explicit request to spread his message, Arps deliberately helped Tarrant
spread his violence online.293 Arps effectively showed purpose to aid in Tarrant’s
offense, meeting the threshold for accomplice liability under the MPC.294 Tarrant
desired the continuing republication of his attack online in case he would be unable
to do so himself.295 When Arps and other actors stepped in to help keep the video
online, they aided Tarrant in his offense of continuing his terror and intimidation
by reproducing footage of the live killings.296
In looking at a common thread among manifestos, there often exists either a
desire to create a legacy in the name of a cause or reference to someone who
previously carried out an attack.297 The almost assured promise for notoriety acts
as a motivating factor for the shooter to continue on with his plans.298 For example,
Tarrant’s manifesto cited inspiration to Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian man
convicted of a bombing in Oslo and a mass shooting at a summer camp for
children.299 Following Tarrant’s attack, a twenty-one-year-old Norwegian man

290. See Macklin, supra note 13, at 18 (describing Tarrant’s deliberate posting on 8chan prior to the attack,
linking his manifesto, and providing directions on how to access his live-stream on Facebook once it began).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See White Supremacist Philip Arps, supra note 69 (illustrating that Arps shared the video with thirty
people and requested a friend to add the crosshairs); see also United States v. Boleyn, 929 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir.
2019) (describing the requirement of “proof that the accomplice intended to promote or facilitate the underlying
crime” under the MPC, which would require Arps to have known of Tarrant’s request).
294. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(describing the elements for accomplice liability), and New Zealander Jailed, supra note 6 (explaining Arps’
manipulation and sharing of the video), with Macklin, supra note 13, at 18 (explaining that Tarrant had requested
for others to continue to share his media online after the attack).
295. Macklin, supra note 13, at 18.
296. See White Supremacist Philip Arps, supra note 69 (describing Arps’ addition of cross-hairs and kill
count to Tarrant’s livestream).
297. See Brad J. Bushman, Narcissism, Fame Seeking, and Mass Shootings, 62 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
229, 230–34 (2017) (describing the narcissistic traits of mass shooters and reporting the narcissistic statements
and actions that mass shooters took prior to carrying out their attacks, including a Columbine shooter stating that
he “want[ed] to leave a lasting impression on the world,” and a Norwegian gunman who practiced for interviews
for after the attack and hired a company to “cleanse the online profiles of him after the mass shooting, so that his
grandiose image would be preserved”); Jason Burke, Norway Mosque Attack Suspect ‘Inspired by Christchurch
and
El
Paso
Shootings,’
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
11,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/norway-mosque-attack-suspect-may-have-been-inspired-bychristchurch-and-el-paso-shootings (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the
Norway suspect mentioning the inspiration from other mass shooters and other online extremists in his manifesto).
298. See Shyong, supra note 57 (describing the research that indicates that mass shooters are motivated by
the media coverage that is likely to follow their carnage).
299. Adam Taylor, New Zealand Suspect Allegedly Claimed ‘Brief Contact’ with Norwegian Mass
Murderer
Anders
Breivik,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
15,
2019,
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AM),

960

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
attempted to carry out an attack on a mosque, referred to Tarrant as “Saint Tarrant,”
and claimed that Tarrant chose him to carry out his own act.300 History shows a
repeated pattern of reading, posting, and then acting upon manifestos and the
extremist ideals underlying their texts. 301 Republishing and disseminating videos
on behalf of principal attackers who cannot spread their message themselves helps
to provide the notoriety that many attackers desire. 302 Support from online
communities and the almost assured promise of widespread media coverage work
to maintain the underlying motivating factor to obtain notoriety for their actions.303
The promise of the escape in a getaway car after committing a crime motivates the
principal actor to carry out their initial act. 304 In the scenario of a mass shooting,
the promise of a legacy can provide the shooter with the final push to commit their
act of terror.305 It is this assistance and encouragement that justifies linking the
actions of the principal attacker with the sharer. 306
VII. CONCLUSION
Without a change in First Amendment jurisprudence, it is unlikely that either
federal or state legislatures could enact laws penalizing the glorification of
terror.307 The Internet has created a reality where communication online is more
readily available, easier to use, and less expensive than ever before. 308
“Gatekeepers” that previously existed in society are not present online to keep
potentially dangerous speech at bay, and those who wish to communicate
dangerous messages are better able to find like-minded individuals who share

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/15/new-zealand-suspect-allegedly-claimed-brief-contact-withnorwegian-mass-murderer-anders-breivik/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
300. Burke, supra note 297.
301. See id. (describing coordination on online networks between posters and shooters and the desire to
“inspire – and challenge” others to complete violent attacks).
302. See Jillian Peterson & James Densley, Op-Ed: We Have Studied Every Mass Shooting Since 1966.
Here’s
What
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Shooters,
L.A. TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2019),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-04/el-paso-dayton-gilroy-mass-shooters-data (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that research has indicated that mass shooters have “media
attention [as] one of their main goals”).
303. See Shyong, supra note 57 (describing a study that found that media coverage plays a role in the
frequency of mass shootings and the online cultures that “debate murderers as if they were favorite athletes”).
304. See James Dwyer, The Perfect Crime: History of the Getaway Car, CREDITPLUS (Nov. 27, 2014),
https://www.creditplus.co.uk/blog/perfect-crime-history-getaway-car-6993817/ (describing the “getaway car” as
being something that has been “mythologized into something romantic, despite the ending never quite working
out as planned”).
305. See Shyong, supra note 57 (describing the important role that the media plays in the context of mass
shootings).
306. See Kadish, supra note 153, at 343 (justifying extending liability because “the [accomplice’s] acts are
determined by [their] own choice”).
307. See Shaughnessy, supra note 263, at 980 (arguing that the Brandenburg standard poses an “obstacle”
to passing a law similar to the 2006 Terrorism Act from the United Kingdom).
308. See Weaver, supra note 134, at 1279 (illustrating the modern realities of the internet with increasing
speed and access to information).

961

2021 / How Accomplice Liability Should Extend to Dissemination of Violent
Videos After Mass Shootings
similar dangerous thoughts.309
When a “sharer” goes out of their way to communicate the message of the
shooter, the sharer acts with a purpose to continue the original shooter’s campaign
of terror.310 Underlying policy in support of criminalizing actions that result in
harm to animals and children would likely support some sort of restraint on
depictions of terror. 311 But, as discussed above, it is unlikely that a broad law
penalizing the glorification of terror would successfully withstand a First
Amendment challenge.312 A theory of accomplice liability—where the sharer has
the purpose of promoting and expanding on an act of terror—finds support in the
policy of depriving shooters from what they want: notoriety. 313
In the United States, the doctrine of accomplice liability extends to a wide
range of cases. 314 Our laws have dictated that liability is not extended to just
anyone, but only to someone who aids or encourages in the commission of a
crime.315 We allow this extension of liability to an accomplice because of an
underlying desire for justice, finding that “one who willingly participates or aids
in the commission of a crime deserves punishment.”316

309. See id. (describing the gatekeepers before the internet as restricting access to “radio, television or
newspapers to propagate [potentially inflammatory] views”).
310. See supra Section VI.A (describing the theory of aiding in this context).
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associated fame and subsequent idealization by extremists after mass shootings).
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mass shootings partly drives the motivation to commit them”).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2016) (extending aiding and
abetting theory in the context of firearms possession of a convicted felon); State v. Irvin, 334 N.W.2d 312, 316
(Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (approving the application of aiding and abetting in the context of a robbery); State v. Fuller,
632 S.E.2d 509, 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (allowing imposition of liability through a theory of aiding and abetting
theory in the case of “indecent liberties”).
315. See Kadish, supra note 153, at 337 (applying the liability requires a secondary actor must engaged in
an “intentional action designed to persuade or help”).
316. Rogers, supra note 156, at 1355.
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